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Abstract 
Humans strive for balance between their motivations for 
accurate judgments and their cognitive effort. Although 
heuristic cues provide cognitive shortcuts, heuristic-based 
processing does not guarantee quality judgments. Based 
on the heuristic-systematic model, this study investigates 
if social media users select cues to use for their judgments 
based on cue applicability and reliability, which can facili-
tate more effective heuristic processing. The present study 
examine if (1) commenters’ physical attractiveness and 
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their claims of cognitive effort influence the effects of their 
comments about a political candidate on the viewer’s atti-
tude toward and vote intention for the candidate, and (2) if 
the viewer’s political interest moderates the influences. 
The results indicate that vote intention is significantly in-
fluenced by the cognitive effort cue whereas attitude is sig-
nificantly influenced only when the viewer is interested in 
politics. The attractiveness cue does not have a significant 
influence. 
 
 
C 
itizens use a variety of heuristic shortcuts to 
simplify the often complex task of evaluating 
their political representatives (Lau & Red-
lawsk, 2001), including taking cues from vari-
ous others’ judgments about the candidates. The increas-
ing diversity of information sources in the modern media 
environment adds to the potential complexity of this task, 
increasing the need for simplifying heuristics while alter-
ing the nature of the available cues. Although cues from 
ordinary citizens have long been a staple of political adver-
tising, citizens now encounter such cues in a less filtered 
form in the online comments on various websites. People 
use these other-generated cues for impression formation 
and judgments (Nishimura, 2010), and even when they are 
not influenced in terms of their own opinions, they often 
estimate general opinion climates from available online 
comments regardless of how representative the comments 
are (Lee & Jang, 2010). Social networking sites (SNS) pro-
vide particularly interesting examples of citizen comments 
about candidates because they allow access to more infor-
mation about the commenters including pictures that po-
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tentially serve as “cues about the cues” (Lee & Lim, 2014, 
p.555).  
 Computer-mediated communication (CMC) re-
search has addressed effects of online comments (e.g., 
Walther et al., 2009; Walther & Parks, 2002), but has fo-
cused mostly on what we will call primary cues that serve 
to help evaluate a target. A positive or negative comment 
about a politician is a primary cue because it directly sig-
nals how to evaluate the target, whereas information 
about the commenter such as a photo signals how to evalu-
ate the commenter, which makes it a secondary cue. A re-
cent study found that viewers tend to make a quick judg-
ment based on primary cues (i.e., comments) and pay less 
attention to more subtle, secondary cues (i.e., commenter  
age) unless they are highly interested in the decisions at 
hand (Lee & Lim, 2014). However, secondary cues may be-
come more influential if the primary cues are mixed or in-
consistent, such as when some user comments are positive 
and others are negative. In these situations, it is impor-
tant to understand which secondary cues people use to 
guide their decisions because different types of secondary 
cues can have very different implications for the quality of 
the resulting decisions. Cueing seems relatively positive 
for the health of democracy if it allows citizens to effec-
tively delegate cognitive effort to reliable others and reach 
the same (or better) conclusions, but cueing can be risky if 
it is based on less rational criteria such as the physical at-
tractiveness of the cue source. Because of these opposite 
normative implications, we argue that cueing research 
should go beyond showing that cues are influential and 
also assess why and when they are influential by address-
ing the role of secondary cues. 
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Based on the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), the present study investigates 
the effects of different secondary cues about others’ com-
ments on the viewer’s attitude and behavioral intention. 
Using a web-based experiment in which two primary cues 
(unknown others’ comments on Facebook) signal opposite 
signs, we will examine which have more influences be-
tween relatively more reliable secondary cues (i.e., per-
ceived cognitive effort put by commenters) and less reli-
able cues (i.e., commenter attractiveness) for the quality of 
judgments, and if the viewer’s political interest level mod-
erates these effects.  
 
Heuristic/Systematic Model and Human Judgments 
 As cognitive misers, humans wish to satisfy their 
goals in the most efficient ways possible (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). By utilizing heuristic cues, individuals can make 
judgments without cognitively effortful processing 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are cognitive 
shortcuts that are used as simple decision rules (Chaiken 
et al., 1989). Heuristics function as the basis of quick esti-
mates on such qualities as utility, importance, objective-
ness, trustworthiness, likability, and competence (Lee, 
2015; Sundar, 2008). Anything we encounter in our envi-
ronment that leads us to use a heuristic-based judgment 
or decision can be called heuristic cue. For instance, an 
opinion poll that shows a majority view can be a cue that 
activates a majority heuristic (i.e., a belief that a majority 
view is usually right). 
 Heuristics have been mainly discussed regarding 
assessments of the validity of persuasive messages, which 
 Page 96                    The Journal of Social Media in Society 5(3) 
can lead to subsequent attitudes and behaviors. The heu-
ristic/systematic model (HSM) and the elaboration likeli-
hood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) posit that indi-
viduals with low motivation or capacity prefer forming an 
impression or making a quick judgment using available 
heuristic cues without fully considering all relevant infor-
mation (heuristic/processing) (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). For instance, they tend to accept a per-
suasive message when the message has a high number of 
arguments in it (i.e., number of argument cue), when its 
source (communicator) has an attractive appearance (i.e,. 
physical attractiveness cue) or seems to be an expert (i.e., 
expert cue), or when the message is well-received by others 
(i.e,. others’ reactions cue). On the other hand, motivated 
and able individuals aim for an accurate judgment and 
tend to make a judgment on a message based on the 
strength of its arguments and judgment-relevant informa-
tion (systematic/central processing) rather than simple 
heuristics. In other words, individuals seek to balance 
their specific motivations for information processing and 
the cognitive effort that they must put forth (Chaiken et 
al., 1989). 
 HSM and ELM studies have demonstrated that 
judgments and attitudes that are formed through system-
atic processing are more reliable and stable than those 
formed through heuristic processing. It is well-documented 
in the literature that heuristic cues often lead to biased 
processing, inaccurate perceptions, or poor decisions (e.g., 
McGuire, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, 
using heuristic cues is not necessarily undesirable. Hu-
mans have limited resources (Miller, 1956), and heuristics 
enable individuals to save their cognitive effort by reduc-
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ing complex tasks to much simpler judgmental operations. 
From an economic perspective, it is not reasonable for one 
to retrieve and deliberate on the full range of possible 
choices and compare the relative benefits and costs of each 
choice each time he or she makes a judgment (Mondak, 
1993). If the decision is inconsequential, in particular, it is 
more efficient and even rational to take a shortcut by util-
izing available heuristics (Chaiken, 1980; Downs, 1957). 
Heuristics help individuals with low motivation meet an 
acceptance threshold in decision making with minimal in-
formational input. Heuristics are also useful when mes-
sage arguments are ambiguous (Baron & Kenny, 1986) or 
when time does not permit extensive information process-
ing (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991). 
 More importantly, use of heuristics does not always 
result in a poor judgment. For instance, selecting a medi-
cine based on medical doctors’ recommendations is, in 
most cases, the safest and most reliable way. As system-
atic processing requires ability, heuristics can be very 
helpful for individuals who lack knowledge about the mes-
sage topic or who must process under severe time con-
straints or whose moods drain their resources (Chaiken et 
al., 1989).  
 
Relevance and Reliability of Cues 
 The HSM posits that the type of cognitive process-
ing individuals employ is not just determined by motiva-
tion and ability but by the availability, accessibility, appli-
cability, and relevance of heuristic cues (Chaiken, 1980; 
Chen & Chaiken, 1999). For heuristic processing to initi-
ate, heuristic cues must be available in the given setting 
and also must be activated into working memory at the 
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moment of processing. The potential for activation of a cue 
is based on both its accessibility in memory due to recent 
or frequent prior activation and its applicability to the cur-
rent stimulus environment (Higgins, 1996). Because this 
activation is a fast, automatic process emphasizing simple 
associations, it can result in numerous irrelevant con-
structs being activated, necessitating a relevance judg-
ment phase after activation (Higgins, 1996). Applicability 
is conceptually distinct from relevance. To clarify the dif-
ference between the two, it may help to think of applicabil-
ity as stimulus-applicability and relevance as judgment-
relevance.  For example, when asked what cows drink, a 
person may be tempted to answer “milk” because it is 
automatically and unconsciously judged applicable to the 
stimulus based on two associative connections between the 
memory construct milk and the stimulus (milk-drink and 
milk-cow). If one pauses to consider its actual relevance to 
the judgment, the response water is clearly more relevant 
based on the actual content of the judgment, as opposed to 
the mere associative connections that determine stimulus-
applicability.  
 Perceived relevance of a heuristic cue can be influ-
enced by the frequency with which the heuristic has been 
used successfully in past judgments (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999), the extent to which the heuristic fits or matches the 
task (Higgins, 1996), or by the consciously perceived reli-
ability of the heuristic to the domain in question (e.g., 
Darke et al., 1998). For instance, a medical doctor’s recom-
mendation is a relevant cue for choosing a medicine, but 
not necessarily for choosing a restaurant because it is be-
yond medical doctors’ area of expertise. Reliability is some-
times included as part of relevance, but it should be con-
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ceptually differentiated because a cue can be relevant but 
less reliable. For instance, a medical school student’s rec-
ommendation for a medicine may be relevant but rela-
tively less reliable than an experienced doctor’s recommen-
dation. Problems occur when individuals apply cues to the 
situation where the cues are not relevant or when they 
heavily rely on less-reliable cues.  
 
Attractiveness and Cognitive Effort Cues  
on Social Media Sites 
 The high visibility of others’ comments and photos 
makes social media sites a good platform for heuristic 
processing based on the comments. Studies have found 
that others’ comments significantly and strongly affect ob-
servers’ perceptions of the profile owner or social reality 
(Lee & Lim, 2014; Walther et al., 2008; Walther, Van Der 
Heide, Hamel, & Shulman, 2009). It seems individuals re-
gard others’ reactions as a snapshot of the typical or pre-
dominant opinion, and infer what their appropriate re-
sponse would be (Fein, Goethals, & Kugler, 2007).  
 When others’ comments on a political candidate are 
mixed, however, viewers are likely to seek secondary cues 
for guidance. One of the heuristic cues that are available 
on social media sites is source attractiveness. When indi-
viduals form impressions of others, they tend to rely heav-
ily on information gathered through the visual channel 
(Ekman, Friesen, O’Sullivan & Klaus, 1980). In particular, 
individuals are more likely to agree with an attractive 
communicator’s message than with a less-attractive com-
municator’s message (Chaiken, 1979) unless they are 
strongly motivated for systematic processing (Chaiken, 
1980). This means their evaluations of a persuasive mes-
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sage are partially attributed to their evaluations of the 
source’s attractiveness. In particular, people tend to rate 
attractive others as superior on other trait dimensions 
such as communication skills (Chaiken, 1979) and intellec-
tual competence (Jackson, Hunter, & Hodge, 1995), which 
is called halo effect (Feingold, 1992). The expression “what 
is beautiful is good” reflects the popular generalization fal-
lacy (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). Impres-
sions formed based faces are in general automatic and ro-
bust (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008). On social media sites, 
Facebook users are more willing to initiate friendships 
with profile owners with attractive photos (Wang, Moon, 
Kwon, Evans, & Stefanone, 2010). When Facebook users 
judge on an unknown profile owner, they are influenced by 
physical attractiveness of the person’s friends (Walther et 
al., 2008).  
 If available information about a candidate (e.g., 
sex, age, party affiliation, ideology) does not provide clear 
enough cues to form an impression, viewers are likely to 
be influenced by others’ opinions, and perhaps more by at-
tractive others’ opinions if the opinions are mixed. Given 
that most young Americans are not highly interested in or 
knowledgeable about politics (Converse, 1970; Delli 
Carpini, 2000; Goren, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011), 
their attitudes toward and willingness to vote for the can-
didate may be influenced by attractive people’s opinions. 
 However, physical attractiveness is not very rele-
vant to this situation of political judgment because physi-
cal attractiveness and political expertise are two different 
things. Although less motivated people may base their 
judgments on any available cue regardless of its relevance, 
the cue effect should decrease for highly-motivated people 
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due to more cognitive effort used at the relevance judg-
ment stage. In the context of evaluating a political candi-
date or deciding on their votes, political interest is a rele-
vant motivational construct. Those who are interested in 
politics will not be easily swayed by a peripheral cue like 
commenters’ attractiveness, which will decrease the effects 
of the attractiveness cues. Thus, the following two hy-
potheses are posited: 
 H1: Commenters’ attractiveness will positively  
 affect the viewer’s (a) attitudes toward the  
 candidate and (b) willingness to vote for the  
 candidate.  
 H2: The effect of source attractiveness cue on (a) 
 attitudes toward the candidate or (b) willingness to 
 vote for the candidate will decrease for those who 
 are interested in politics. 
 
 While commenter attractiveness is not a relevant 
cue, a more relevant and reliable form of secondary cue 
would be one that indicates which commenter has put 
more effort into learning about the candidates’ substantive 
policy positions. Although a few visible comments at the 
top of a profile cannot be blindly trusted, if a commenter 
seems to have done some research and analysis to make 
the evaluation, it gives the commenter a temporary expert 
status in the judgment, which raises reliability of his or 
her comment. When individuals lack resources for system-
atic processing, the next best option may be to listen to 
those who have done systematic processing. If citizens can 
at least discern more relevant and reliable cues from less 
relevant or reliable cues and only refer to the better cues, 
such cue-taking behaviors can be a more reasonable, if not 
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optimal, choice process. Further, the assumption that a 
cue source has done the cognitive effort one is trying to 
avoid may be the mechanism underlying past findings that 
cues are more influential when the source is perceived as 
higher in intelligence, knowledge, or expertise (e.g. Mad-
dux & Rogers, 1980). Although it appears that no past 
study has directly tested perceived cognitive effort as a 
mechanism of effects of cues from other individuals, recent 
work on media agenda cueing has done so in the context of 
news effects (Pingree, Quenette, Tchernev, & Dickinson, 
2013; Pingree & Stoycheff, 2013). The use of relevant and 
reliable cues helps individuals make relatively good judg-
ments with little effort, which is the main purpose of using 
heuristic cues. 
 However, only those who have such a heuristic acti-
vated in mind (i.e., those who can recognize that the effort-
claiming comments are more reliable than other comments 
with no such claim) can base their judgments on the effort 
cues. Compared to the source attractiveness cue, the cogni-
tive effort heuristic may be less noticeable and may not be 
activated by some who read the comments. Thus, it is pos-
sible that only highly-motivated individuals recognize and 
are influenced by the cognitive effort cues. That is, al-
though it is in general low-motivation individuals who pre-
fer heuristic-based judgments, the relevant and reliable 
cue might have more influence on individuals who are mo-
tivated for systematic processing such as those who are 
interested in politics. Thus, the following hypothesis and a 
research question are posited: 
 H3: Commenters’ cognitive effort will positively  
 affect the viewer’s (a) attitudes toward the  
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candidate and (b) willingness to vote for  
 the candidate.   
 
 RQ1: Will the effect of the cognitive effort cues on 
 (1) attitudes toward the candidate or (2) willingness 
 to vote for the candidate increase for those who are 
 interested in politics? 
 
Method 
Study Design  
 An online experiment was conducted in a 2 
(supportive commenter’s attractiveness: high vs. low) x 2 
(supportive commenter’s cognitive effort: high vs. low) be-
tween-subject factorial design. Both attractiveness and 
cognitive effort were operationalized through a mock Face-
book profile of a fictitious political candidate named David 
Miller. 
 
Participants  
 The data were collected in November and Decem-
ber, 2013. A total of 365 undergraduate students (men 
49%, women 51%) of a large Midwestern university par-
ticipated in the study for extra course credit. The average 
participant was 21.46 years old (SD = 3.70). There were 
more whites (75.6%) than non-whites (Asian or Asian 
American 8.9%, African or African American, 6.6%, His-
panic 2.2%, Others 6.6%). There were more Republicans 
(37%) than Independents (34.2%) or Democrats (25.7%).   
 
Procedure 
 Upon entering the experiment website, participants 
were randomly assigned into one of the four attractiveness
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-by-effort conditions and exposed to the screenshot of the 
mock-up Facebook page. Then, they rated their feelings 
about the candidate and their intention to vote for him as 
well as answered questions about their demographics and 
individual characteristics. 
 
Stimuli 
 Differing versions of a mock Facebook profile of 
David Miller were created (see Figure 1 & 2 for examples). 
In the screenshot, participants could see Miller’s profile 
photo and a short description of him as a city council mem-
ber and candidate for mayor, which was common to all 
conditions. On the profile page displayed were two young 
men’s comments on him in the form of wall posts. In all 
conditions, one of the two comments was positive and the 
other one was negative.  
 To choose the high and low-attractiveness profile 
photos, 33 publicly-available (shared or donated to re-
searchers) digital headshots were collected. Through a pre-
test with 142 college students, the two photos that re-
ceived significantly different scores on attractiveness (M = 
3.86 vs. 1.98 on a 5-point scale) but similar on perceived 
intelligence (M = 3.31 vs. 3.23) were finally selected and 
used in the experiment. In the high-attractiveness condi-
tion, the positive comment was posted with a highly-
attractive man’s profile photo whereas the negative com-
ment was with a less attractive man. In the low-
attractiveness condition, the positive comment was 
matched with the less attractive man. Half of the partici-
pants in each attractiveness condition were assigned into 
the high-cognitive effort condition. In that condition, the 
positive comment indicated that its commenter expended 
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significant time and cognitive effort before evaluating 
Miller by saying, “After reading your book and the policy 
proposals on your website, I have to say…” On the other 
hand, the negative comment implied that its commenter 
did not do much effortful research or systematic analysis 
by saying, “I don’t know much about you, but you seem 
like…” In the low-cognitive effort condition, the same com-
ments had opposite valences; the positive comment 
claimed no effort and the negative comment claimed a 
high effort.  
 To address the possible confound of primacy effects, 
half of participants in each of the four conditions saw the 
positive comment first at the top of the page followed by 
the negative comment below it, and the other half saw the 
Figure 1. Stimulus for the high-high condition where the posi-
tive commenter is more attractive and claims more cognitive 
effort. Commenters’ photos were blurred for publication pur-
poses. 
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negative comment first followed by the positive comment. 
While other parts of the Facebook page were kept the 
same, only the comments, commenters’ photos, and the 
order of the comments were manipulated. 
 
Measures 
 Source cue attractiveness and claim of effort by the 
cue source were operationalized as experimental condi-
tions. Attitude toward the candidate (Mstandardized = -
.01, SDstandardized =.89, Cronbach’s α = .92) was an aver-
age of a normalized feeling thermometer score and scores 
for three normalized attitude items. The feeling ther-
mometer question asked participants to rate their overall 
feelings of Miller from 0 to 100 (M = 51.84, SD = 17.28), 
Figure 2. The stimulus for the high-low condition where the 
positive commenter is more attractive and claims less cognitive 
effort. Commenters’ photos were blurred for publication pur-
poses. 
thejsms.org 
Page 107 
and the 3-item attitude index was made of 9-point bipolar 
scales ranging from bad, unacceptable, and unfavorable (1) 
to good, acceptable, and favorable (9) (Cronbach’s α = .91, 
M = 5.48, SD = 1.36). For vote intention, participants indi-
cated how likely they would be to vote for the political can-
didate (1 = not at all, 9 = very likely, M = 4.95, SD = 1.75). 
Political interest was measured by asking, “How inter-
ested are you in politics in general?” (1 = not at all, 11 = 
very interested, M = 5.33, SD = 2.63).  
 
Results 
 A set of hierarchical regression analyses was per-
formed using a SPSS-based macro PROCESS (Hayes, 
2012). Participants’ age, sex, race (white vs. non-white), 
self-reported social class and order of comments (positive 
first vs. negative first) were entered as control variables in 
Block 1, followed by main predictors and the moderator in 
Block 2: commenter attractiveness, cognitive effort, and 
the viewer’s political interest. H1 expected a positive rela-
tionship between commenter attractiveness and the 
viewer’s (a) attitude toward and (b) willingness to vote for 
the candidate who was positively evaluated by the com-
menter. The results showed that neither attitude nor vote 
intention was significantly influenced by attractiveness of 
commenters; H1 was not supported.  
 H2 examined if participants’ political interest 
would moderate the effects of source attractiveness on (a) 
attitude toward or (b) willingness to vote for the candidate. 
For the interaction tests, the interaction term 
(attractiveness x political interest) was added to the 
model, one at a time (see Table 1). Analyses of the modera-
tion models revealed that source attractiveness effect was 
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Table 1 
Interaction effects between the viewer’s political interest and 
either commenters’ attractiveness or commenters’ cognitive ef-
fort on the viewer’s attitude toward the candidate (N=355) and 
the viewer’s intention to vote for the candidate (N=354)  
  
  
Attitude  
toward  
candidate 
Vote  
intention 
  
  b SE b SE 
Block 1 Age -.02 .02 -.04 .03 
  Sex -.02 .09 -.20 .18 
  Race .14 .11 .21 .22 
  Class .02 .06 .03 .12 
  Order .20* .09 .21 .19 
Block 2 Pol Interest .06* .03 .09 .04 
  Attractiveness .01 .14 -.10 .18 
  Cog. effort .16 .14 .32+ .18 
Block 3 
Attractive x 
Pol Interest .05 .04 .10 .07 
(Model1) 
R2 .05*   .05*   
  ΔR2 due to in-
teraction .01   .01   
Block 3 
Cog. x Pol  
Interest .08* .04 .07 .07 
(Model 2) 
R2 .06**   .05*   
  F (9, 345; 9, 
344) 2.22   2.12   
  ΔR2 due to in-
teraction .01*   .003   
*** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05, + p <.10  
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not significant regardless of political interest, showing 
that there is no interaction between the two variables. 
Thus, neither H2a nor H2b was supported. The models 
that tested the interaction effects of source attractiveness 
and political interest explained 5.5% of variance in atti-
tudes toward the candidate (F [9, 345] = 2.22, p < .05) and 
5.3% of variance in intention to vote for the candidate (F 
[9, 344] = 2.12, p < .05).  
 H3 hypothesized a positive relationship between 
claim of cognitive effort by the cue source and the viewer’s 
(a) attitude toward and (b) willingness to vote for the can-
didate who was positively commented on by the source. 
The result of regression analysis indicated that comment-
ers’ cognitive effort significantly affected the viewer’s vote 
intention (b = .32, one-tailed p = .04). However, no signifi-
cant effect was found for attitude. The regression models 
that tested the effects of cognitive effort cues explained 
4.9% of variance in attitudes toward the candidate (F [8, 
346] = 2.23, p < .05) and 4.7% of variance in intention to 
vote for the candidate (F [8, 345] = 2.11, p < .05). 
 When it comes to RQ1, political interest signifi-
cantly conditioned the effects of claims of cognitive effort 
on attitude toward the candidate (RQ1a) was found, b 
= .07, p = .03. When probed using the Johnson-Neyman 
technique, the interaction was significant only for political 
interest above 7.82. This interaction was not significant 
for vote intention (RQ1b), indicating that the significant 
main effect of cognitive effort on vote intention was not 
conditioned by political interest. These moderation models 
that tested the interaction between cognitive effort and 
political interest explained 6.1% of variance in attitudes (F 
[9, 345] = 2.50, p < .01) and 4.9% of vote intentions toward 
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the candidate (F [9, 344] = 1.97, p < .05). 
 Among controls, the order of cues (i.e., between the 
two comments which appears at the top) significantly pre-
dicted attitude toward the candidate in both final interac-
tion models, b = .20, p = .03, and b = .22, p = .02, respec-
tively; the valence of the first comment among the two 
comments exerted a stronger influence on the viewer’s at-
titudes and vote intention. Although it was not the focus of 
this study, this order effect can be explained as primacy 
effect, which refers to the disproportionally large influence 
of information acquired early in the process on the final 
judgment (Nahari & Ben-Shakhar, 2013), or confirmation 
bias which refers to the human tendency to unconsciously 
seek and interpret behavioral data in a way that confirms 
the first impression or prior expectations about the target 
(Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). This finding demon-
strates that the order of information also functions as a 
cue that activates a heuristic (i.e., the first impression is 
usually right), whether the viewer is conscious or uncon-
scious of it. 
 
Discussion 
 The fast evolution of social media provides new con-
texts where cue-taking is happening. CMC users now have 
a wide variety of cues they can refer to including secon-
dary cues about primary cues. It is also common that dif-
ferent cues send mixed signals. However, relatively less 
attention has been paid to the different roles various sec-
ondary cues play in choosing among mixed primary cues. 
 The present study investigated how two secondary 
cues affected the viewer’s attitude toward and willingness 
to vote for the political candidate. We hypothesized that 
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both attractiveness and cognitive effort would positively 
influence attitude and vote intention, with the effect being 
larger for those with lower political interest. First, unlike 
our prediction, even those who had little political interest 
were not significantly influenced by the attractiveness cue, 
not to mention those with high political interest. This 
might be because the commenters’ photos, presented at 
the same size as real photos in comments on Facebook, 
were too small to clearly show little details of the less-
attractive man’s face, particularly if participants were us-
ing a small screen. Or, it might be because we matched the 
perceived intelligence levels of the more or less attractive 
commenters when we chose their pictures. According to 
the halo effect, people tend to regard attractive others as 
intellectually competent, thereby rating them as higher in 
other performances than they actually are (Feingold, 
1992). Because we chose two people who looked similarly 
intelligent based on a rigorous pretest, the halo effect 
might have disappeared. If none of these are the reasons, 
this non-significance might be a good sign that college stu-
dents are not as irrational as we presumed. They may 
have judged the attractiveness cues irrelevant to candi-
date evaluation. Even if they may be influenced by source 
attractiveness in other persuasion situations (e.g., pur-
chasing a cosmetic product), they may not be swayed by 
commenters’ appearances when they evaluate political 
comments, particularly if the more-attractive and less-
attractive commenters look similarly intelligent. Further 
investigation is needed to be able to explain this result, 
but it is promising that young people who were known to 
be more visual-oriented than older generations (Thomson, 
2009) did not blindly follow attractive commenters’ opin-
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ions.  
 Second, it is notable that the viewer’s vote intention 
was significantly influenced by whether the cue sources 
claimed cognitive effort to evaluate the candidate. This 
demonstrates that average college students discerned 
more reliable comments from less reliable ones based on 
the commenters’ claims of effort, and decided on their 
votes based on more-reliable comments. This effect was 
observed whether they were politically interested or not. 
On the other hand, the cognitive effort cue did not signifi-
cantly influence the viewer’s attitudes toward the candi-
date unless he or she was highly interested in politics. The 
significant interaction effect between cognitive effort and 
political interest in predicting attitudes demonstrate that 
only highly-motivated people selectively referred to more 
reliable comments based on their claims of cognitive effort. 
 These contrasting findings may imply that people 
pay more attention to the relevance and reliability of cues 
when the judgment at hand is willingness to vote for the 
candidate than when it is merely a personal impressions 
or feeling toward the candidate. Because the importance of 
cognitive effort is neither the only heuristic nor the most 
easily accessible heuristic in the environment, the viewer 
may need a more motivating context to activate the heu-
ristic. As vote decisions are in general more important 
than rating personal feelings, the former seems to have 
motivated the average viewer to differentiate more reliable 
cues from less-reliable cues and to avoid taking the order 
cue (i.e., accepting the first comment) whereas the latter is 
not important enough to make less-interested people care-
fully evaluate the comments. 
 It may be counterintuitive that more-motivated 
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people are more likely to utilize heuristic cues because, in 
most HSM or ELM studies, heuristic cues were manipu-
lated to be less significant or relevant than other informa-
tion and, therefore, not influential for highly-motivated 
people. In the real world, however, there can be a variety 
of cues at varying levels of relevance and reliability. Heu-
ristics can actually facilitate a rational decision-making 
process as long as relevant and reliable cues are consid-
ered. In that case, the more motivated people are, the 
more likely they are to be influenced by the cues, as our 
findings demonstrate.  
 
Limitations and Conclusions 
 Some limitations and boundary conditions of this 
study should be acknowledged. First, the sample consisted 
entirely of young college students, so care should be taken 
when applying the results of this study beyond the age 
group. Also, as this experiment aimed to test causal effects 
of commenter attractiveness and claims of cognitive effort, 
inevitably we limited the amount of available information 
about the candidate to control the environment while real-
world voters can consider other things such as issue posi-
tions and policy proposals. However, given that average 
American citizens have low levels of political sophistica-
tion (Converse, 1970; Delli Carpini, 2000; Goren, 2013; 
Pew Research Center, 2011), we believe others’ strong 
opinions highly accessible in the immediate environment 
are still powerful cues even compared to other informa-
tion, particularly in small election settings. Moreover, 
even on real politicians’ social media sites, detailed infor-
mation about their issue positions and policy proposals is 
hard to find out or understand whereas their updates on 
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trivial daily activities and user comments are highly visi-
ble.  
As only two profile photos are used for commenters 
in this study, those cannot represent all Facebook com-
menters’ attractiveness levels. As in most media effects 
experiments, a single message treatment is used to test 
the effects of a broader category of message (Jackson & 
Jacobs, 1983). For better generalizability, further replica-
tions of this study with different age groups and different 
stimuli are recommended. As an online experiment, the 
environment where each participant was participating in 
the study was not tightly controllable. Some might have 
been in a distracting environment where others were bet-
ter focused on the study. Nevertheless, the level of distrac-
tion is something that is likely to be randomly distributed 
to the randomly assigned groups, and significance tests 
capture the degree to which we are confident that it is our 
experimental manipulation that explains the group differ-
ences instead of those possible other differences.  
The present study has significant theoretical impli-
cations. Instead of comparing effects of a heuristic cue and 
a message argument, we focused on others’ reaction cues, 
which is relevant to and realistic in our social media envi-
ronments, and examined the layers of effects in relation to 
their relevance and reliability. By examining the different 
levels and qualities of cues, we attempted to propose a way 
that heuristic processing can function in a relatively more 
desirable way. While addressing applicability as a neces-
sary condition of cue activation relative to HSM, Chaiken 
did not elaborate on situations where irrelevant cues are 
applied or how relevance and reliability can be criteria of 
desirable use of heuristics. With the present study, we at-
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tempted to fill in the theoretical gaps. By manipulating 
both comments’ valences and claims of cognitive effort in 
the comment cues, this study also tested the role of secon-
dary cues (i.e., cues about cues) in verifying primary cues’ 
reliability.  
This study bears practical implications. As social 
media have become young people’s dominant information 
sources, other-provided cues such as other users’ com-
ments increasingly influence their perception, attitudes, 
and behaviors. Instead of lamenting the phenomena, we 
believe we must ask how citizens can function more effec-
tively in heuristic-based judgments. The answer, we be-
lieve, lies in citizens’ closer attention to the relevance and 
reliability of the cues they take. Not every opinion com-
ment is based on substantial research, and attractive ap-
pearances of commenters, in most cases, do not guarantee 
reliability of their comments. Because there are always 
more lurkers than posters in the social media world, it 
should be noted that some uninformed outsiders’ opinions 
can easily dominate the environment just because they 
post or comment more often than others. However, we sug-
gest that heuristic processing can be effective and helpful 
if the viewer takes advantage of appropriate secondary 
cues to choose more reliable primary cues. The findings of 
this study suggest that boosting motivation (i.e., interest) 
levels is likely to be an effective means to facilitate such 
effective heuristic processing. Future studies should fur-
ther investigate the ways in which heuristic processing 
can have more positive implications for individuals and 
the society. 
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